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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether

the

lower

court's

finding

of

fact

that

plaintiff's bills to defendant became due and payable on the 10th
of the month after billing, (thereby starting the running of the
four year Statute of Limitations) is clearly erroneous.
Standard of Review;

Findings of fact should not be set aside

unless clearly erroneous, and due regard must be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses.
2.

Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Whether

the

lower

court's

finding

of

fact

that

defendant's long time employee had apparent authority to purchase
a generator is clearly erroneous.
Standard of Review; Findings of fact should not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard must be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses.

Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES.
ORDINANCES AND RULES
None
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves plaintiff, Petersen Electric Inc.'s action
against defendant David Williams for goods and services delivered
by plaintiff on a time and material basis. The plaintiff performed
1

the work for defendant on an hourly rate plus materials and then
later sent bills for the defendant to pay.

The defendant did not

know

receiving

the

amount

to

pay

until

after

the

bill.

Notwithstanding the fact the plaintiff's action was brought within
4 years of the date that defendant received bills, defendant claims
that plaintiff's action is barred by the Statute of Limitations.
The lower court made a finding of fact that the plaintiff's
bills to defendant did not become due and payable until the 10th of
the month following billing.

The plaintiff contends that the

Statute of Limitations did not begin to run until the bills became
due and payable, thereby making plaintiff's present action against
defendant timely.
One of the items that defendant purchased from plaintiff was
a generator.

The generator was ordered by defendant's long time

trusted employee, Mr. Don Lloyd.

Prior to Mr. Lloyd's ordering a

new generator the defendant had asked that the plaintiff repair
defendant's older generator. At that time the parties thought the
only

thing

wrong with

the generator

was

a

"seized" engine.

However, when plaintiff began to take the old generator apart, it
discovered that not only was the engine "seized/' the armature in
the generating portion was burned making the generator worthless.
Thereafter, this information was conveyed to the defendant.

Mr.

Lloyd later called the plaintiff and placed an order for a new
generator.

The new generator cost roughly the same amount as it

would have cost to rebuild the old generator.

The lower court

entered a finding of fact that Mr. Lloyd, at the time he ordered
2

the new generator to replace the worthless old generator, was
acting

with

apparent

authority

from

defendant.

On appeal,

defendant disputes this finding of fact.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Plaintiff, Petersen Electric, Inc., is a Utah Corporation

owned by Mr. Mac Petersen.

Plaintiff is in the business of

electrical contracting, radio communications, and generator sales
and services.
2.

Defendant, David Williams, is the owner of two companies,

Industrial Communications Inc. and General Broadcasting Inc. dba
KFAM Radio Station. Although both companies are now corporations,
the lower court found that at the time of the sales and services
relevant hereto, both companies were dba's or alter egos of Mr.
Williams. (R. 332-333) Thus, plaintiff's judgment in this case is
entered against Mr. Williams personally. (R. 353)
3.
services.

Plaintiff's

action

is

for unpaid

credit

sales and

The lower court found that sums set forth in invoices

marked as trial exhibits 3, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 in the
total amount of $13,424.74, were properly owed by defendant and
were not barred by the Statute of Limitations since suit was filed
within four years of billing.

The court ruled that invoices

introduced as exhibits 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 were not owed
by the defendant since these invoices were billed more than 4 years
before plaintiff instituted legal action. (R. 347-350)
4.

Plaintiff and defendant have a business relationship

extending back approximately 20 years.
3

(R. 394-395)

During 13 or

14 years of this time defendant had an employee he characterized as
trusted and valuable. (R. 542, lines 7-8) This employee, named Don
Lloyd, served as Service Manager in one of Mr. William's companies
and Chief Engineer in another.

(R. 580-592)

In the course of

business dealings it was common practice for Mr. Lloyd to call
plaintiff and other vendors to order services and materials on
behalf of defendant's companies.
608, R. 619)

(R. 424-425, R. 585, R. 594, R.

Mr. Lloyd signed work authorizations on behalf of

defendant when the vendor required such.

(R. 629, lines 10-25)

Mr. Lloyd signed for goods delivered on credit.

(R. 631-632) Mr.

Lloyd negotiated modifications in partially performed contracts.
(R. 397, lines 3-11)

Overall, Mr. Lloyd had very broad authority

to purchase goods for defendant's companies.
testified

at trial, Don Lloyd

defendant's companies.

As one vendor

"was the man to talk to" at

(R. 626, line 4)

Mac Petersen testified

that in his company's relationship with defendant's companies,
defendant turned virtually everything over Don Lloyd.
5.

(R. 397)

Plaintiff provided its services to defendant on a time

and material basis. (R. 307)

Plaintiff's employees would keep

daily records of the hours worked and materials used. (R. 421, 658)
The daily diaries would later serve as the basis for a bill or
invoice sent by plaintiff to defendant. The invoice summarized the
work, the number of hours, the hourly rate and the cost of
materials to reach a final invoice amount.
18)

4

(See e.g. Trial Exhibit

6.

Sometimes plaintiff delayed sending a bill to defendant

to make sure that the work performed by plaintiff solved the
problem the defendant had been having.

Sometimes bills were

delayed for other reasons which the lower court found "reasonable."
(R. 311, 346)
7.

The invoices did not become due and payable until the

10th of the month after billing.

(R. 3 35)

Each of the invoices

stated "terms net 10th prox." indicating payment was due on the
10th of the month following billing.

(R. 456-457)

Many such

invoices were signed by defendant's authorized employees.

(R. 545-

546, Trial Exhibits 2, 5, 9, 10, 11) The plaintiff did not expect
payment until after billing.

(R. 470, lines 8-12)

The defendant

did not know the amount to pay until after billing.

(R. 307) The

defendant did not believe he was required to pay until the bill
came in.
8.

(R. 528, line 18)
All of the invoices set forth in trial exhibits 3, 12,

13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 were mailed to defendant on September 30,
1985 or after.
9.

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on October 3, 1989.

The lower court entered a specific finding of fact that

under the arrangements between plaintiff and defendant, payment did
not become due until the 10th of the month after billing.

Thus,

all of plaintiff's invoices allowed by the lower court did not
become due and payable until October 10, 1985 at the earliest. (R.
335)
10.

One of the items sold by plaintiff to defendant was a

backup generator for defendant's broadcasting facilities on Kesler
5

Peak to the West of Salt Lake City.

This sale became necessary

after plaintiff's employees flew with defendant's employee, Don
Lloyd, to the defendant's transmitter on Kesler Peak. (R. 430) The
purpose of the trip was to repair the generator on the mountain.
When the crew arrived it was discovered that the gasoline engine
that drives the electricity generating armature in the generator
was "seized."

Consequently, the entire generator had to be flown

down the mountain to the plaintiff's shop. (R. 4 31)
11.

After the generator was down the mountain, defendant,

David Williams took a quote from plaintiff for fixing the seized
engine.

At that point both parties assumed the seized engine was

the only thing wrong with the generator.

(R. 431, lines 20-25)

Mr. Williams then directed plaintiff to do the work.
plaintiff's

shop

foreman

began

taking

the

generator

After
apart,

plaintiff discovered that not only did the generator have a seized
engine, but the other main part of the generator, the armature, was
also burned out. (R. 432, 568, 642)
generator

worthless

and made the

This discovery left the

cost

of repairing

the old

generator about the same cost as buying an entirely new generator.
(R. 432-434, R. 644, lines 21-25, R. 647)
12.

After learning this new information, Don Lloyd called the

plaintiff on the telephone and placed an order on behalf of
defendant's company for a new generator. (R. 434)l

Relying upon

defendant claims that Don Lloyd testified at trial that
plaintiff did not tell Don Lloyd that Mr. Williams had asked that
the generator be repaired.
Defendant refers to R. 585 (see
defendant's brief p. 12). Don Lloyd did not testify in the manner
in defendant's brief. Mr. Lloyd never made the statement defendant
6

this order plaintiff ordered a new generator from the manufacturer
(plaintiff did not have commercial generators of that type in
stock).
13.

(R. 645)
After plaintiff delivered the new generator to defendant

Don Lloyd called Mr. Petersen to ask if Mr. Petersen could rewrite
the invoices to show the generator as a rebuild rather than a new
generator. (R. 435) This was the first plaintiff learned that Mr.
Lloyd was being second guessed by Mr. Williams.

(R. 435-436)

However, by then plaintiff had already incurred the liability with
his supplier. (R. 437) At trial Don Lloyd testified when he placed
the order he thought Mr. Williams would want a new generator rather
than a total rebuild for the same price.
14.

The lower court made a finding of fact that Don Lloyd

acted with apparent authority in ordering the new generator.
308-309)

(R.

The lower court also found that ordering a new generator

was the economically advisable action for the defendant to have
taken when Mr. Lloyd placed the order on behalf of defendant. (R.
308-309).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1)

In determining the indent of the parties on an oral

contract, the trial court should

consider all the evidence,

including the contract's purpose, nature and

subject matter.

attributes to Mr. Lloyd. (See R. 585) Moreover, it is obvious
from the abundance of testimony that Mr. Lloyd knew that the
generator had been sent in for repair, but that plaintiff had found
the generator worthless. (R. 581, lines 16-21, R. 582, R. 430, R.
433) After all, Mr. Lloyd directed the initial trip to retrieve
the generator off the mountain. (R. 430)
7

Construction of an oral contract is for the trier of fact.

The

lower court in this case determined that the evidence demonstrated
defendant's debt to plaintiff was not due and payable until the
10th of the month following billing.

The great weight of the

evidence supports the lower court's finding of fact in this regard.
Since the debt did not become due and payable until 10 days after
billing, the 4 year Statute of Limitations did not begin to run
until 10 days after billing.

Hence, plaintiff's law suit against

defendant is not barred by the four year Statute of Limitations.
2)

The lower court's finding of fact that defendant's

employee, Don Lloyd, acted with apparent authority in purchasing a
generator on behalf of defendant is supported by the weight of the
evidence and is not clearly erroneous.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE FOUR YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BEGAN TO RUN ON THE 10TH OF
THE MONTH FOLLOWING BILLING, THE DATE THE BILL BECAME DUE AND
PAYABLE
The plaintiff in this case commenced its action within four
years of the time the defendant received bills.

The defendant

argues that the Statute of Limitations barred the plaintiff's
action because the statute began to run from the time the contracts
were performed rather than the time that the defendant was billed.
This argument fails because: 1) the lower court made a specific
finding of fact that the bills did not become due and payable until
the 10th of the month following billing and the evidence plainly
supports this finding of fact; 2) pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the
8

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the court's finding of fact cannot
be overturned unless clearly erroneous; and, 3) as a matter of law
credit sales, such as the ones from Petersen Electric to David R.
Williams only become due on demand (or billing) unless the contract
specifically states otherwise; in the present case, demand was not
made until Petersen Electric sent its bills.
The

following

subsections

will

consider

each

of

these

arguments in further detail.
A.

The "Clearly Erroneous11 Standard of Review
Applies to the Lower Court's Finding Fact that
"the Invoices did not become Due Until the
10th of the Month Following Billing."

This case was tried to the court, Judge Timothy R. Hanson.
The defendant contends that no deference should be given to Judge
Hanson's

conclusions

on

the

Statute

of

Limitations

issue.

(defendant's brief P. 2) Defendant further argues that payment is
due upon performance

"absent an agreement to the contrary."

(appellant's brief P. 7)

Defendant then goes on to state:

Each agreement in its fundamental terms was:
When
Petersen provides the specified materials, supplies or
labor, then Williams will pay. Williams' obligation to
pay accrued immediately upon final delivery and
performance giving Petersen an immediate right to sue for
payment.
(defendant's brief P. 8).
Defendant makes this statement without reference to the record
and cites no support for this statement. Based upon this statement
defendant argues that the Statute of Limitations began to run
before defendant was even billed for the work.

Unfortunately,

defendant overlooks the fact that Judge Hanson made findings of
9

fact that control this issue and his findings are subject to the
"clearly erroneous" standard of review. In other words defendant's
entire argument is based upon facts contrary to those found more
believable by Judge Hanson.
By using the words "absent an agreement to the contrary"
defendant admits that the intent of the parties governs. Hence, if
the parties intended that payment be due only after billing, this
intent controls.

Judge Hanson made a specific finding of fact

indicating his conclusion that the parties intended that payment
was not "due and payable until the 10th of the month following
billing at the earliest."

(R. 335, finding of fact number 10)

Furthermore, the court found that the bills were calculated on a
time and material basis and not on a firm quotation basis as
defendant had contended.

(R. 333)

In its Memorandum decision the

court stated:
As to the claims of the plaintiff in general as to the
amount of work performed and the amount charged, the
Court finds that the best evidence supports the factual
finding and the conclusions as suggested by the plaintiff
that the work was performed on a time and materials
basis, as opposed to a firm quote as suggested by the
defendant . . . .
The Court finds that the defendant's evidcmce on this
issue is inconsistent and nonpersuasive.
(R. 307).
This

finding

supports

the

conclusion

that

billing

was

necessary before the debt became due and payable since defendant
would not know the amount of time or materials for which he was to
be charged until a bill was actually sent.

10

Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states in
part, "[f]indings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to
judge the credibility of the witnesses."2

A finding of fact is

only "clearly erroneous" if it is against the clear weight of the
evidence or if it induces the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made.

Grimm v. Roberts, 784 P.2d 1238 (Utah Ct.

App. 1989); Mauahan v. Mauahan. 770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989);
Monroe. Inc. v. Sidwell, 770 P.2d 1022 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
court

has previously

held

that

if a trial

court

bases

This
its

construction of a contract on "extrinsic evidence of intent, the
construction is reviewed as a question of fact and our review is
strictly limited."

Craig Food Industries. Inc. v. Weihincr. 746

P.2d 279, 283 (Utah App. 1987).

To successfully challenge the

trial court's finding, the defendant must marshall all of the
evidence supporting the finding and then demonstrate that the
evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even when
it is viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court. Reid
v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. . 776 P.2d 896, 899-900 (Utah
1989). Accordingly, Judge Hanson's finding of fact that the debt
did not become due and payable until after billing should not be
overturned unless the weight of the evidence clearly indicates that
he made a mistake. As shall be demonstrated hereafter the evidence
2

The rule goes
n to say that findings of fact can be
manifested in formal findings or in a memorandum decision. In this
case the court entered both.
11

supports the conclusion that the intent of the parties was that the
debt be due and payable only after a bill was sent.
B.

The Lower Court's Finding of Fact that Payment
did not become Due Until After Billing is
Supported By The Evidence.

The terms and conditions of a contract are governed first and
foremost by the intent of the parties.
813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991).

Wineaar v. Froerer Corp.,

Construction of an oral contract,

"is for the trier of fact." In re Relationship of Eqqers, 638 P. 2d
1267

(Wash App.

1982) .

The

intent

of the parties may

be

demonstrated by their actions. Eie v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 638
P.2d 1190 (Utah 1981).

In determining the intent of the parties

the court should consider the contract's "purpose, nature and
subject matter."

Driqqs v. Utah State Teachers Retirement Board,

142 P.2d 657 (Utah 1943).

In considering the "purpose, nature and

subject matter" of the contract in the present case there is ample
evidence to support the lower court's finding of fact that payment
was not due until the 10th of the month after billing.
First, as earlier stated, the lower court found that the
contracts were time and material contracts.
asked prices in advance.

(R. 419-420)

The defendant seldom
The plaintiff billed

defendant an hourly rate for its work, plus materials, in much the
same way that a law office bills its clients an hourly rate plus
costs.

(R. 419-420) In this form of billing the customer does not

know when to pay, the amount to pay, or even a full description of
the work performed until after he or she has been billed.

12

The

defendant admitted at trial that he did not keep records showing
amounts owed before the bill came in.

(R. 555-558).

In the present case the defendant suggests that plaintiff had
the right to sue before even sending a bill,

(defendant's brief P.

8) However, with a time and materials contract can it be said that
defendant breached his agreement to pay before he even knew the
amount to pay?

The Utah Supreme Court has said the Statute of

Limitations cannot begin to run until a breach occurs. Fredericksen
v. Kniaht Land Corporation, 667 P.2d 34, 36 (Utah 1983); M.H.
Walker Realty Co. v. American Surety Co.. 211 P.998 (Utah 1922).
The defendant in this case could not have breached his contract
before even being told the amount owed.

Certainly it was the

expectation of the parties that some type of bill or notice be sent
before payment became due.

On this point one court has stated

"where (as in the instant case) demand or notice is a condition
precedent, it is universally held that the Statute of Limitations
does not commence to run until the notice or demand is given."
Stice v. Peterson. 355 P.2d 948, 953 (Colo. 1960).

In this case

notice, in the form of a bill, was a condition precedent to
payment, and to any breach, because Mr. Williams did not know how
much to pay until billed.
The evidence in this case indicates that Mr. Williams himself
did not consider the debt due and payable until he received a bill.
In fact, one of Mr. Williams' claims at trial was that he was never
billed.

The trial court noted in its memorandum decision "[w]ith

respect to the defendant's claim that he never received any of the
13

invoices representing work done by the plaintiff, the Court finds
no merit to that claim."

(R. 310)

The fact that defendant chose

to defend his case on the claim that he never received plaintiff's
bills

is evidence

of defendant's

belief

that

billing

was a

necessary condition to payment.
Further evidence of defendant's intent is found in his own
testimony concerning instructions given to his employees. He told
his employees to pay the debt "when the bill comes in."
line 17, R. 555, line 11)

(R. 528,

Put another way, the employees were not

to pay the debt until a bill was received.
Further evidence supporting the court's finding of fact that
payment was not due until after billing, comes from the invoices
themselves.

The defendant claims these invoices were "one sided

ministerial acts, unilaterally sent, which did not affect the
substance of the transaction."

(defendant's brief P. 11) Defendant

further quotes a 1968 Arizona case for the proposition that
invoices are not bills of sale. Farm & Auto Supply v. Phoenix Fuel
Co., 442 P.2d 88 (Arizona 1968).

Unfortunately, the evidence of

the present case completely refutes these assertions.
It is clear the bills were not "one-sided" as claimed by the
defendant. The plaintiff and defendant had been doing business and
billing each other for about 20 years.

(R. 394-395)

On these

invoices, as demonstrated by the trial exhibits, the words, "Terms
Net 10th prox." appeared.

Mr. Petersen testified that these words

meant payment was due on the 10th of the month after billing (R.
456-457, R. 146 512)

Mr. Petersen clearly testified that it was
14

his intent that payment be due only after billing.
see also R. 146)

(R. 456-457,

Also, the invoices say "please pay on this

invoice" thereby indicating plaintiff's intent that the invoice
serve as a bill.

Moreover, over the years many of the invoices

with these terms "Net. 10th prox." were signed by Mr. Williams'
authorized employees. Five of these signed invoices were included
as trial exhibits.

(Trial exhibits 2, 5, 9, 10 and ll)3

The parties' 20 year course of business dealing, was certainly
a proper area of consideration for the lower court. Section 70A-2208(1) of the Utah Code States:
Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions
for performance by either party with knowledge of the
nature of the performance and opportunity for objection
to it by the other, any course of performance accepted or
acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to
determine the meaning of the agreement.
(emphasis

added)

This

court

has held

that where

there

is

uncertainty, the trier of fact should examine the "background and
surrounding circumstances" to make a determination.
Jager, 806 P.2d 219, 222 (Utah App. 1991).

Sprouse v.

The background of 20

years of billing including signed invoices with the words "Terms
Net. 10th prox." and "please pay on this invoice" was certainly
relevant.

These facts combined with the fact that defendant never

paid prior to billing certainly lends support to Judge Hanson's
finding of fact that the bills were not due and payable until the
10th of the month after billing.

*Mr. Williams testified his employees were not acting improper
in signing these invoices. (R. 545-546)
15

Curiously, one of the main cases defendant sites in support of
its position, actually strongly supports affirmation of the lower
court's decision.
Hotte

Granite

In William Feinstein Brothers, Inc. v. L.Z.

Co.,

184

A.2d

540

(Vermont

1962)

(cited

in

appellant's brief at page 7) the seller's invoices used the terms
"2% 15 da 30 da 30 da net."

The parties offered conflicting

interpretation of this provision and a question arose as to when
payment

was due.

The Vermont

Court

held

that

under

these

circumstances the issue of when payment was due was a question of
fact, for the trier of fact, and not a question of law.

id. at

542-543.
In the present case the meaning of the words "Terms Net. 10th
prox.," was never really disputed.

Mac Petersen was the only one

that offered extrinsic testimony and he said it meant the invoices
were due on the 10th of the month following billing. (R. 456-457)
As articulated by the Vermont Court, it is for the trier of fact,
in this case Judge Hanson, to make the final adjudication as to
meaning and intent.

The court's finding of fact that the bills

became due and payable on the 10th of the month following billing
shows how the trier of fact resolved the matter.
It is clear from the record the parties understood their
invoices to be more than the invoices described in the definition
given by the defendant.

The record shows that both plaintiff and

the defendant used the terms "invoices" and "bills" synonymously.
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Both parties considered invoices and bills to be the same thing,4
Furthermore, the
performance•

invoices were not drawn up at the time of

They

were

drawn

up

after

service

calls

were

performed, from daily diaries kept by the plaintiff's employees.
(R. 421)

Again the closest analogy is a lawyer keeping time

records from which an invoice or bill is later composed and sent.
In this sense the bills sent by Petersen Electric were very
different from the traditional merchandise sales tickets being
described by the definition utilized by defendant.

Billing by

Petersen Electric was the event that summarized the work done, and
signaled that the bill was due and payable.

(R. 456)

Further evidence of the parties' intent that the debt was not
due and payable until after billing is the testimony of Mac
Petersen concerning a conversation he had with defendant.

(R. 414)

In the conversation defendant asked plaintiff when a bill was going
to be sent on a completed project. Why would Mr. Williams ask when
the bill would be sent unless he was wondering when he would be
required to pay?

When Mr. Petersen indicated he was going to hold

off sending a bill for a while he drew no objection from defendant.
4

(R. 395, line 8; 397, line 5; 399, line 6; 400, line 14; 402,
lines 4, 5; 404, line 2; 406, line 9; 410, line 3; 411, line 25;
413, lines 12, 23; 414, lines 16, 24, 25; 415, line 2; 416, line 3;
417, line 18; 422, line 7; 423, lines 17, 19; 427, line 11; 428,
line 3; 437, line 21; 442, line 14; 445, line 21; 446, line 14;
447, line 18; 449, line 9; 453, line 2; 454, line 2; 458, lines 10,
11; 459, line 10; 460, lines 4, 12, 24; 462, line 11; 463, line 13;
467, line 24; 468, line 3; 470, line 9; 471, line 9; 472, line 9;
478, lines 16, 25; 484, line 4; 572, lines 7, 10; 573, lines 3, 4,
6, 11, 13, 16, 20; 575, lines 12 13, 17, 23; 576, line 1; 577,
lines 9, 10; 578, lines 15, 19, 22; 621, line 2; 622, line 2; 659,
line 10; 661, line 1).
17

The tenor of the conversation is that both plaintiff and defendant
considered billing a prerequisite to the obligation becoming due
and payable.

As indicated earlier, a bill must become due and

payable before the Statute of Limitations can begin to run. O'Hair
v. Kounalis, 463 P.2d 799, 800 (Utah 1970).
Further evidence that the parties did not consider the debt
due and owing can be found in the record:
All plaintifffs trial exhibits. Finance charges were
only assessed by plaintiff after billing, not from date
of performance.
R. 423: Bills were sometimes not sent out until a month
or two after equipment was repaired in order to assure
the problem was fixed before requesting payment.
Indicates that payment was not expected until bill sent.
Trial Exhibit 25: In letter from David Williams to Mac
Petersen, Mr. Williams several times refers to the
invoices as bills.
R. 447 & 453: Testimony indicates that invoices are
bills.
Overall, the evidence indicates that Judcje Hanson made a
correct finding of fact.

There is no clear error.

Moreover,

defendant has not even appealed the court's finding that plaintiff
performed the work satisfactorily and was not paid.

The Utah

Supreme Court has said "when an admitted service has been rendered
and not paid for, natural justice makes a strong appeal."
v. Parker,

134 P.2d

180, 182-183

(Utah 1943).

Bishop

Under these

circumstances this court should affirm the lower court's decision.
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C.

credit Sales Without a Specified
become Due and Payable on Demand.

Due Date

The defendant, relying upon the lower court's ruling that the
defendant did not maintain an "open account" with plaintiff, seems
to argue that this finding makes plaintiff's sales to defendant
cash transactions.

If this is what defendant is saying this is

simply incorrect. In the first place plaintiff never received any
cash, or else we would not be before this court.

Furthermore, a

review of the evidence, arguments and rulings makes it apparent
that the plaintiff's sales and services were rendered on credit
even though defendant may not have had an "open account" with the
plaintiff.

Finally, as a matter of law credit sales such as these

are not due and payable until demand, unless an agreement specifies
the due date.
The issue of whether an open account exists is relevant in
this case for those unpaid invoices that were billed prior to
September of 1985 and were thus barred by the four year Statute of
Limitations unless they could fall into the open account exception
of §78-12-25 of the Utah Code.

Under this exception, invoices

billed more than four years prior to filing the suit would not be
barred by the Statute of Limitations if the invoices were part of
a series of charges on an "open account."

Defendant contended

before and during trial that the series of charges did not
constitute an open account, but were independent transactions.
Relying upon Bishop v. Parker, 134 P.2d 180, 182-183 (Utah 1943)
defendant argued that eleven elements were required for an open
account.
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

7.
8.
9.
10.

An Account;
Usually kept;
Properly kept;
By express or implied agreement;
Containing a connected series of debit and credit entriets
or reciprocal charges and allowances;
Having as an intention of the parties that individual
items not be considered independently; but as a
continuation of a related series;
Account kept open;
Subject to shifting balance;
Open until either party settles or closes account;
One single and indivisible liability;

11.

Liability fixed at time of settlement after last entry.

6.

(R. 281).
Defendant argued that an open account did not exist because
these elements, especially those of a running account balance, and
a relationship between transactions were not present. (R. 282-283)
The defendant stated the evidence "more properly described a credit
account arrangement or a quote and billing practice."

(R. 282)

Thus, at trial defendant did not argue that the transactions were
not credit arrangements, only that the credit transactions, when
viewed together, did not constitute an open account.
In ruling on the issue of open account the court said:
On the plaintiff's claim that it dealt with the defendant
on an open account, the Court is satisfied that the
elements of establishing an open account have not been
met by the plaintiff.
(R. 310) (emphasis added).
The court went on to hold that invoices billed more than four
years before suit was commenced are barred by the Statute of
Limitations and plaintiff has not appealed that decision. However,
the language of the ruling makes it apparent that the court was
only ruling that the elements for an open account did not exist,
20

not that the sales were not credit transactions. Clearly the sales
were credit transactions since the time and materials billing only
allowed payment after performance and billing.

Mac Petersen

clearly believed he was providing services on credit. (R. 470-471)
Even the defendant's closing argument admitted that the evidence
pointed toward "a credit account arrangement or a quote and billing
practice." (R. 282)
Defendant asserts that it is "universally held" that the
Statute of Limitations commences running on performance. Defendant
draws support for this statement from §70A-2-310(a) of the Utah
Uniform Commercial Code.

However, defendant overlooks §70A-2-

310(d), the subsection applicable to credit sales which states:
where the seller is required or authorized to ship the
goods on credit the credit period runs from the time of
shipment but postdating the invoice or delaying its
dispatch will correspondingly delay the starting of the
credit period.
(emphasis added)
In the present case in those circumstances where plaintiff
delayed billing/ the credit period did not begin to run until the
bill was sent. If the credit period did not start during that time
the Statute of Limitations did not begin to run.
With respect to credit sales the correct "universal rule" has
been articulated as follows:
If the contract fixes no time for payment, payment is due
on demand, unless the debtor is admittedly unable to pay,
which obviates the necessity for making a demand.5

5

60 Am Jur 2d, P. 887.
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Accordingly, this court, as a matter of law as well as upon
the findings of fact, should affirm the lower court,
II.
THE PLAINTIFF PROPERLY RELIED UPON DON LLOYD'S APPARENT
AUTHORITY WHEN IT ORDERED A GENERATOR FROM ITS SUPPLIER.
DEFENDANT IS BOUND BY THE ACTIONS OF HIS AGENT.
With respect to defendant's argument that his agent, Mr. Don
Lloyd, had no authority to purchase a new generator, an overall
reading of the testimony shows that in making his argument,
defendant has selectively pointed this court to the evidence most
favorable to his own position. The defendant ignores the fact that
the

lower court

in this case consistently

found

plaintiff's

evidence more believable both on the agency issue and on all other
issues.6
Defendant again urges that no deference be given to the lower
court's findings of fact that defendant's agent had apparent
authority

to purchase

a generator.

(appellant's brief p. 2)

However, even in reading the agency issue as defemdant has stated
it, it is clear that the issue is one of fact, to which the
"clearly erroneous" standard of review applies.7 In its memorandum
decision in this case, the court said:
On the issue of the generator, the Court finds that the
plaintiff supplied a new generator to the defendant at
the request of defendant's agent. While the defendant
6

At R. 308 Court suggests defendant's evidence on the agency
issue is not believable.
At R. 307, court states defendant's
evidence is "inconsistent and non persuasive." At R. 309 Court
states that plaintiff's evidence is the most "believable and
logical."
7

See discussion of Standard of Review p. 8 to 10, Supra.
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disputes that his agent had the authority to order a new
generator, there is no believable evidence that would
suggest that the plaintiff had been made aware of the
defendant's directions to his agent at the time the order
for the new generator was placed. Defendant's agent.
when the order was placed for the new generator rather
than the rebuilt generator, had apparent authority to act
on behalf of this principal, the defendant, and the
testimony shows that the ordering of a new generator was
in any event economically advisable when done.
Accordingly, if the defendant has problems with the
commitments made to third parties, including the
plaintiff, by the defendant's agent, the defendant should
look to his agent in that regard.
(R. 308-3 09) (emphasis added)

(Also, see. Finding of Fact number

8, R. 334 which states in part "[D]defendant's agent had apparent
authority

to

act

on

behalf

of

defendant

in purchasing

the

generator.")
Having made these findings of facts, this court need only
determine if the findings are against the clear weight of evidence.
An

overall review of the testimony

and documentary

evidence

presented to the court demonstrates that Judge Hanson's findings of
fact on the issue of agency and the ordering of the generator are
supported and are not clearly erroneous.
A.

Don Lloyd had Actual and Apparent Authority
to act on Behalf of Defendant in Purchasing
Goods and Services.

At trial, Don Lloyd was called as a witness for the defendant.
Mr. Lloyd testified he worked for the defendant for over thirteen
years. (R. 579)

During that time he worked as Service Manager at

one of Mr. Williams' companies and simultaneously as Chief Engineer
at another.

(R. 580-592)

Mr. Lloyd related several occasions

where he, acting as defendant's authorized agent and employee,
contacted plaintiff and ordered work or materials.
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(see e.g. R.

585

lines

12-24, R.

responsibilities

608, lines

were

3-10)

to deal with

Part

vendors.

of Mr. Lloyd"s
(R. 594)

This

responsibility included Mr. Lloyd contacting vendors and telling
them to perform the work or deliver the goods.
lines 3-10, R. 619)

(R. 594, R. 608

Mr. Lloyd said on many purchases he did not

need specific authority from Mr. Williams. (R. 595)

On some

occasions when materials or work was ordered from plaintiff, bv Mr.
Don Lloyd, Mr. Williams was present thereby clearly indicating to
plaintiff that Mr. Lloyd was acting with Mr. Williams1 approval.
(R. 424-425)
Mr. Harold Schmidt also testified about the nature of Mr.
Lloyd's authority. Mr. Schmidt worked for another vendor that soLd
to defendant.

Mr. Schmidt testified that Mr. Lloyd signed work

orders on behalf of defendant. (R. 629, lines 10-25)

Mr. Lloyd

signed on behalf of defendant for the receipt of goods ordered on
credit.

(R. 631, lines 11-19; R. 632, lines 1-4)

Mr. Wen Winegar, officer of another vendor, gave further
examples of Mr. Lloyd acting on behalf of defendant in ordering
goods and services.

(R. 624-626)

To Mr. Winegar's company, Don

Lloyd "was the man to talk to" when dealing with defendant's
companies.

(R. 62 6, line 4) In dealing with Mr. Winegar's company

Mr. Lloyd made the initial contacts, negotiated the price, and gave
final approval for the work.

(R. 623-627)

Mac Petersen testified similarly about his company's dealings
with defendant's companies.

Mr. Petersen testified that he had

known and worked with Don Lloyd as defendant's employee for many
24

years,

(R. 396)

Mr, Lloyd was Mr. Williams' "key employee" and

"Dave's right-hand man." According to Mr. Petersen, "whatever Dave
wanted, turned it over to Don, and Don went about it, and got the
job done." (R. 396, lines 20-25).
Mr. Williams himself clearly led plaintiff and others to
believe that Don Lloyd had complete authority to negotiate prices,
make purchases, order work and even modify agreements. On at least
two occasions, defendant sent Don Lloyd in his place to negotiate
changes in prices on unpaid invoices.

On those occasions Mr.

Williams said "Don will handle it" or "I sent Don over to take care
of those."

(R. 397, lines 3-9)

all, of the credit purchases.

Don Lloyd handled most, but not
(R. 397, lines 10-12)

As already

noted, Mr. Williams was present on some occasions as Mr. Lloyd
ordered materials or work from plaintiff.

(R. 397-398)

Even the defendant himself testified that Mr. Lloyd dealt with
plaintiff in the sale or exchange of materials.

(R. 527, lines 6-

9) The defendant testified that Mr. Lloyd was a trusted and
valuable employee.

(R. 542)

Mr. Williams said Mr. Lloyd could

make purchases without Mr. Williams approval if it were "urgent."
(R. 544-545)

Other employees were authorized to make purchases on

behalf of defendant as well.

(R. 546, lines 1-7)

From these facts brought forth at trial, the lower court's
conclusion that Mr. Lloyd had apparent authority to act on behalf
of Mr. Williams in ordering a new generator is well supported. Mr.
Lloyd was dealing with plaintiff in the same manner as he had for
more than a decade.

Furthermore, as the lower court found,
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ordering

a new

generator,

as opposed

to rebuilding

the old

generator, made economic sense in light of the circumstances.
It should be kept in mind that a portable generator only has
two main parts.

The first is the gasoline engine that turns the

generator, the second is the electricity generating armature. (P.
642)

When plaintiff

initially discussed

a rebuild with Mr.

Williams, none of the parties were aware that the armature needed
to be replaced. (R. 432, 568)

At that time the parties only knew

that the engine would not start because it was "seized up."
431, 641)

(R.

Only after repairs on the engine commenced was it

discovered the armature was also ruined. (R. 432, 642) This meant
that virtually the entire generator needed to be replaced and
defendant would be economically ahead buying a new generator
instead of rebuilding the old.

(R. 436, 605)

Also, the old

generator's manufacturer recommended against fixing a burned out
armature.
problem.

(R. 642)

A burned armature is a serious and expensive

(R. 642, lines 20-25)

At trial plaintiff's former shop

foreman, an expert in the field, testified the burned out armature
left the generator "worthless." (R. 644)
The discovery of the burned out armature chcinged everything.
Rebuilding the engine portion did not make sense since defendant
would still be left with a generator that was ruined.

At that

point, defendant had three choices: (1) have the plaintiff rebuild
the engine only, as had previously been discussed by Mr. Williams
and Mr. Petersen,

(leaving defendant

with

a still worthless

generator); (2) have plaintiff rebuild the engine and armature for
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about the same cost as a new generator; or

(3) order a new

generator for about the same cost as a rebuild.

Because the first

alternative was really no alternative at all, the circumstances
required a decision to be made by the defendant whether to rebuild
the entire unit or to order a new generator.

Where plaintiff had

been dealing with Mr. Lloyd as defendant's "right hand man" for
more than a decade, and was accustomed to dealing with Mr. Williams
and Mr. Lloyd interchangeably (R. 397), plaintiff acted reasonably
when it relied upon Mr. Lloyd's instructions to order a new
generator.
Defendant attempts to make a point that plaintiff should have
inquired into the scope of Mr. Lloyd's authority since Mr. Williams
had only ordered a repair of the old generator.

This argument

might have had some merit had it not been discovered that the
armature was burned out. However, the burned out armature made the
old arrangements obsolete.

Under these new circumstances Mr.

Lloyd, acting with apparent authority, entered into a new contract.
It should be remembered that Don Lloyd called plaintiff to place
the order, plaintiff did not call defendant. (R. 434)

Moreover,

plaintiff was ambivalent as to whether defendant purchased a new
generator or fixed the old generator since selling a new generator
did

not

generate

more

revenues

rebuilding the old generator.
would

for

the

plaintiff

than

did

Plaintiff simply felt defendant

be ahead with a new generator.

(R. 436, lines

1-5)

Accordingly, plaintiff had no reason to expect that Mr. Lloyd was
acting improperly.

Even Mr. Lloyd testified he thought defendant
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would approve a new generator. (R. 600-601)

There was nothing out

of the ordinary about Mr. Lloyd's call. Everything in plaintiff's
many years of dealing with defendant told plaintiff that Don Lloyd
had authority to place such an order. As far as plaintiff knew Mr.
Lloyd was acting with Mr. Williams1 approval.
Under these circumstances, it is clear that the agent, Mr.
Lloyd, did not vary the terms of an existing contract.

Instead

changed circumstances made the old contract impossible in the sense
that a mere engine repair would not accomplish the goal of giving
defendant a working generator.

These circumstances necessitated

the formation of an entirely new contract.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated (in the chief case relied
upon by defendant):
[T]he general principle of the law of agency is that
principals are bound by the acts of their agents which
are within the apparent scope of the authority of the
agency and a principal will not be permitted to deny such
authority against innocent third parties who have relied
on that authority.
Forsyth v. Pendleton. 617 P.2d 358, 360 (Utah 1980). The plaintiff
in this case is an innocent third party that relied upon an agent
acting within the apparent scope of his authority.

The apparent

authority is adequately established by the testimony.

This court

should not overturn the lower court's findings in this regard.
The defendant also argues that plaintiff attempted to deceive
defendant into believing that plaintiff had actually rebuilt the
old generator.

It should be kept in mind that the first that the

plaintiff learned that Mr. Lloyd may have ordered the new generator
without the approval of Mr. Williams was after Mr. Petersen had
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ordered the generator from his supplier, had taken delivery of the
new generator, and sent a invoice to the defendant.

Mr. Lloyd

intercepted the invoice and called Mr. Petersen to write up the
invoice as if the generator was a rebuilt generator.

Both Mr.

Lloyd and Mr. Petersen's testimony agree in the fact that this is
the first Mr. Petersen learned of the problem. Accordingly, by the
time plaintiff learned of the problem he had already performed his
part of the bargain.

If there was deception by Mr. Lloyd, Mr.

Petersen was its chief victim.

If Mr. Petersen had any idea that

the new generator was not wanted he would not have special ordered
it from his supplier.
The defendant has presented no compelling reason to overturn
the lower court's finding of fact that apparent authority existed
in defendant's agent. While defendant has cited an ancient out of
state case for a general principle of law that an agent with
authority to enter contracts, cannot vary a contract made by a
principal, the facts of this case are different. The agent in this
case ordered a new generator when it became clear that the old
generator was worthless and could not be economically repaired.
The agent had a long history of dealing with plaintiff and others
in similar circumstances.

Plaintiff's reliance upon agent was

reasonable.
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CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals should affirm the decision of the lower
court.
DATED this 14th day of August, 1992.
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